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UTILITY RATE STRUCTURES:
WHAT WE CAN AND SHDUID DO
AND
WHAT WE CAN’T AND SHOULD NOT DO
Charles David Laderoute
General Rate Analyst
Consumers Power Company, Jackson, Michigan
Adjunct Instructor
Jackson Community College, Jackson, Michigan
The opinions in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of Consumers Power Company or Jackson Community College or any
other person associated with these organizations.

Abstract
This paper analyzes the economics of a number of items of interest in public
utility rate design. These include: lifeline rates, time-of-day rates,
marginal cost pricing, and so-called "free services." (1)

Ch March 3, 1972, the Madison Gas and Electric Company

utility rate design.

filed a rate case to increase both gas and electric

food for thought for regulators as well as those em

rates.

ployed by regulated firms, economists as well as en

All matters other than final electric rate

design were concluded in December of 1972. (2)

During

Au3ust of 1973 and January of 1974 hearings were held
0,1 the matter of final electric rate design.

At that

gineers.

I trust my comments will provide

Of these four categories I must admit that I

am at a disadvantage with respect to experience in the
first category-

However, I can speak reasonably well

t® e a nimber of experts in the field of public util-

on the other categories since I am employed in the

%

Rate Department of a large combination gas and elec

rate economics, Dr. Charles Olson, Dr. Charles

Cjcchetti, and Dr. Irwin Stelzer, among others, ad-

tric u tility.

W3cated changes to electric rate structures which, in

comments contained herein are those solely of the

^

author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any

Words of Wisconsin Public Service Ccmission Chair-

(I wash to stress the point that the

10911 Eich, would be "a 'national' test on electric rate

organization with which I am associated).

^ign." (3)

graduated from this institution (University of Missouri

Though it may be questionable whether the

Further, I

c®se vas a "national" test, it certainly aroused a

- Itolla) in 1971 with a B.S. in Engineering Management

9Ceat deal of interest and raised a few eyebrows. (4)

- Mechanical Engineering Minor and in 1972 with a B.S.
in Economics. (5)

Thus in stating any comments, crit

^ t^*-s paper I wish bo discuss seme current issues of
icisms, or suggestions directed at these four group® I
u^ i t y rate design, none of which are new, many of
will do so in an as objective manner as possible.
V*^c*1 have gained the limelight since (and perhaps as a
Oonsecpence of) the Madiscn Gas Case.

I hope that in

Until the late 1960's little was written about utility

^ Presentation I too will raise a few eyebrows and

rate structures. (6)

P^Suade you to think about ar re-think sane of the

it is virtually impossible for an individual to keep

issues which are currently of central importance to

np his reading in this field.
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Today that is no longer the case;

Why?

Because until the

late 1960' s the cost of electricity was declining and

Service Commission and the Federal Power Ccrttnissicn,

bad been for at least 40 years.

in a speech in 1975 referencing LRIC felt that its use

For example, the

national average price per kWh of electricity for a

might "substitute instead a bunch of fuzzy-cheeked

residential customer declined from approximately 7C/kWh

economists with their econometric models" for regula

in 1927 until it reached a price of about 2.1C/kWh in

tory ocmmissicns.

1970.

and economists was not necessary.

Since then it has increased to about 3.78C/kWh

Heavy handed criticism of economics
It must be pointed

which interestingly is about the same price it was in

cut that the central area of utility rates is micro

1940 or 38 years ago.

economics, though the entire area of rates benefits

(7)

(These costs are all in

nominal terms, that is, they have not been reduced to

from engineers, accountants and legal personnel, as

real terms by adjusting for the effects of inflation.)

well as eocnanists.

Because of this, until the late 1960's there was ipsa

Why?

interest in rate structures than in rate levels.

siders speaking a foreign language telling the regu

During the 1960's many utilities had rate decreases.

lators that they were doing everything wrong and that

Since that time three items have reversed that trend:

if they would just use marginal cost pricing, every

But same criticism was justified.

Into the hearing room marched a bunch of out

1) reduced dynamic economies of scale, 2) increased

thing would be all right.

capital costs, and 3) the unpleasant present bestowed

textbook theory is not necessarily readily applicable

They did not realize that

on us by OPEC in 1973.

to the real world.

When costs started rising so did the ire and interest

Many ratemaking principles were still being debated

of many diverse groups - environmentalists, citizens

even after 20 or more years. (9)

groups, welfare groups, ocrtmercial and industrial

expand the debate to what Frank Walters, Vice President

intervenors, and academicians.

These groups joined

Furthermore, they were a bit naive.

The impact was to

of Potomac Electric Power, has called "the great rate

the traditional participants to the ratemaking process

debate." (10)

- regulators, utility personnel and attomeys-general.

At this point it was basically engineers and accoun

So many people became interested that it lead one indi

tants (in utility rate departments) versus economists

vidual to refer to electricity price regulation as a

(as economic experts for interveners in rate cases).

"new group participation sport." (8)

The National Association of Regulatory Utility Com

One subgroup

that has been quite bothersome in the eyes of utility

missioners in a very level-headed manner passed a

personnel has been academic or professional economists.

resolution in December 1974 at its annual convention

Tradit ionally the rate department of a utility has been

which asked the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and

staffed and supervised predominantly by engineers.

the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to inves

Wien the economists arrived at Madison, so did +h»ir

tigate the possibility of various rate related items

jargon - price elasticity of demand, econometrics, in

including "the technology and cost of time-of-day

verted rates, marginal cost pricing, inverse price

metering and electronic methods of controlling peak

elasticity rule, et al.

period usage of electricity, and also a study of the

This jargon was received with

about as iruch fanfare as if an engineer walked into a

feasibility and cost of shifting various types of

meeting of the American Economic Association and

usage from peak to off-peak periods." (11)

The re

started talking about entropy, temperature gradients,

search developed from this study should help resolve

the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, or eddy-current

many of the issues which have <-rme> forward since the

losses.

itedisen Gas Case.

The typical reaction was something to the ef

In this paper I would like to dis

fect of; Who are these guys, what are they talking

cuss four issues closely associated with this study

about, and what do they think they're doing statping

and try to put them into perspective.

on n y turf?

line rates, time-of-uae rates, margined aost pricing

Cne of the initial reactions by those in the regu

and "free" services.

lated industries was to poke fun at this group.

A

They are life

LIFELINE RATES

common joke about five years ago was to refer to the
The Lhited States is a mixed capitalist society.

That

costing principle of Dr. Irwin Stelzer, Long Run Incre
is, the basic framework of our society is capitalist
mental Cost (LRIC) as "Let's Run, Irwin's Caning."
Sane were even mare serious.

For example, J. R.

wherein resources and businesses are owned and oper
ated for the most part by individual citizens.

How

addler, a former Chairman of the New York Public
ever, the

388

government or public sector is responsible

for nearly a third of gross national product.

With

consumer sovereignty.

This cannot take place if they

the exception of government activity, in our econcrty

receive subsidized goods.

the market system is the major mechanism used to allo

for them can only b e reached if they are given money.

cate resources.

To this argument it is often retorted that the poor

With this in mind, two issues are of

The maximization of utility

paramount importance in discussing the issue of life

person vri.ll "waste" the money on "frivolous" goods

line rates.

rather than using the money to purchase necessities

First, There Aint No Such Thing As A Free

lunch (TANSTAAFL).

Someone has to pay for the goods.

which may include gas or electricity.

Second, if some type of welfare assistance is desired

If that in fact

is what they do, it is someone's value judgement or

for certain groups, for whatever reasons, that assis

opinion that determines this.

tance should be designed by legislatures and not

preferences for goods and services and in general may

within the judicial or quasi-judicial arena of a regu

be they don't value utility service as high as other

latory system.

things.

Ist's look at these in reverse order.

A public service

caimission should not advocate nor implement intention
al lifeline rates.

Why?

The major reason is that most

states have some form or another of laws which pre

This is basically an extension

more, this is beside the point.

This could

checks payable to the utility.

However, many say that, for exanple, poor people
This point has not
(12)

However, if one thinks

agency and not through rate structures.

Discrimination within a class is sinply not

are snail users of electricity.

Cnly that person can

determine what is "wasteful."

be accomplished either directly or by the use of energy

This is between different classes of cus-

been proven and continues to be debated.

consumption of another person.

groups' bills should be paid by a government welfare

iened are those where differences in cost to serve can

fair.

Finally,

"waste" is a value judgement and cannot be ascribed to

vices rather than "frivolous" goods then the subsidized

'Hie only types of discrimination that usually are al

boners.

don't get a chance to show their preferences.

determined that money should be spent a n utility ser

of the due process provisions of our constitution.

be found.

If subsidized goods are provided to them they

they can determine what is best for another and it is

scribe that rates set by a public service caimission
nust not discriminate.

Even poor people have

Now looking at TANSTAAFL.

If utility service is pro

vided at subsidized prices, resources are misallocated

Further

Another factor is that

since the subsidized consumer will tend to over-oonsume.

Also, the party paying the subsidization would

utility service is received most usually under circum

tend to under-ccnsure.

stances of no choice of substitute firms providing the

Since that is an unrefutable economic fact of life,

9°ods or service.

then blatant discrimination will occur if a lifeline

A customer usually has no choice of

a different company.

If residential rates have sane

rate is implemented.

Provision for lifeline rates, wtot is the nonlife lire
rate payer to do?
dize others,

Traditionally utility customers have been segregated

Perhaps he has no desire to subsi-

into certain classes which are relatively homogenous,

with many utility oantnissioners being

appointed rather than elected, he has no recourse.

Finally, someone has to pay.

have similar load patterns, and have similar costs to
At

serve.

l®ast if the legislature passes a lifeline provision

This led to what is called postage stamp rates.

This was dene for two reasons.

the individual can vote to "throw tie rascals out."

First, it was logical.

Second, and most important, it allowed the utility to

business system, though, is not the appropriate

have a small nixrber of rates which could be easily

^ahicle for doling out welfare or redistributing

understood and manageable in an administrative sense.

inccme; that is a government function.

With this in mind the only type of discrimination al

Mother reason against lifeline rates is that if you

lowed was where costs could be shown to differ.

'fcnt to help a "poor" person you don't give them sub

different rates would apply on an inter-class basis

sidized goods - electricity, gas, or whatever.

because of differences in cost to serve.

^uthape they don't particularly want more electricity

intra-class differences as declining block rates were

ar gas at a cheaper rate.

variations with usage levels.

The best

fonn of giving welfare, if it nust be given, is to

If one tries to justify that the poor or seme other

9ive the recipient money and let them purchase what
they want.

Also such

justified because of the differences in cost to serve

Perhaps they want a better

°°at, or better food or to go to a movie.

Thus

group has certain characteristics that theoretically

Even the welfare recipient should have

show differences in cost to serve, then the entire
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issue of postage stamp rates mast be reviewed.

Ibis

is so, since taken to the limit every single customer

cost to supply that quantity demanded also varies,
prices should vary by time of day to the extent pos

has his or her own peculiar load characteristics an!

sible.

hence differences in cost to serve.

This line of

are offset by the benefits derived by time-of-day

reasoning has been used as follows:

Many proponents

pricing, then rates should be set on a time-of-day

That is, if the costs of additional metering

of lifeline rates say that the poor are relatively

basis.

small users of utility services.

far time-of-day pricing.

So are resort cot

tages owned by the relatively affluent yet one would
not wish to provide them with subsidized energy.
again, though, is beside the point.
set on cost to serve.

This

Rates should be

Because a certain group is a

Even at the residential level there is room
This is especially useful

for those utilities having a significant air condi
tioning or electric space heating load.

Metering im

provements and reduced metering costs are becoming note
evident and could make time-of-use pricing more prac

small user of energy it does not necessarily follow

tical in the near future.

that it is less costly to serve them.

especially those with time recording meters in place,

Thus, much care

mist be used in developing rates far subclasses of
service.

The result m ay be discrimination.

Par most other classes,

time-of-use pricing should be implemented.

(13)

I would like to expand a little on this.

T3ME-CF-USE RATES

Certainly

the load shape matters to the utility per se.

It

The market time period for utility service has tradi

wants to minimize costs and it is definitely less

tionally been a month.

But the utility does not sell

costly to have a high load factor than a lower one.

It sells services continually cn

It is in the utility's best interests to attenpt to

services in a month.

a minute b y minute basis.

flatten the system load by electro-mechanical load

(The following line of

thought is much more applicable to electric utilities

management devices or by rate design.

than gas though generally the same principles hold

the utility should have its customers permission.

true.)

That is, the utility should not put controls on water

Danand far electric service is continually

But to do this

shifting from low danand in the early morning hours to

heaters or air conditioners (or other load management

higher levels as the day progresses.

devices) unless the customer stipulates that it is okay

An electric util

ity is not selling the same product at 2:00 A M as it is

to d o so.

at 2:00 PM cn a hot Tuesday in August.

deviate from costs simply to change the system load

This point

Also, implementing rate structures that

should be kept in mind - the same product is not being

curve is not correct.

sold.

correctly follow the oost to serve at different times

If rates are designed which

of day then the optimal system load will follow.
When time—of-use pricing is discussed for electric
utilities, many individuals start talking about load

Along these lines one often hears the argument that

factors, the load shape and load management.

people don't want to work the third shift or that

These axe

all separate things and they don't matter anyway in a
pure economic sense.

That's right, the load factor of

people don't went to do their laundry at 2:00 AM.
People do the things they went to when they do because

a utility does not natter if the oost of providing ser

that is what they want.

vice is being paid, given the customer's ccnsuipticn

ployees) m a y not wish to operate the graveyard shift

preferences.

so as to save cn the firm's electricity bill.

The load shape is brought about by con

A manufacturer (and its em

The tias

sumers demanding a product and the resulting load shape

that people want to wash their laundry or work in a

reflects those customers1 demands — serving the desires

factory, etc. necessarily will dictate a system's load

of the customers is the reason a utility exists.

I

don't mean to demean the importance of these items.

curve when aggregated for all consumers.

Rates should

be based o n costs and these vary by the time of day.

Naturally if a utility hats a high load factor it's to

If a consumer wishes to change his load pattern because

their customers' advantage; but if they have a monthly

they value money higher than the time they participate

peak which is 1,000 M«J higher than their next highest
monthly peak, that doesn't matter (given the caveats
noted above). That is what the customers want.

The

only thing that does matter is that customers are pay

in same activity, then rates varying by time of day a«i
allow them to reduce their bill.

Further, load shift

ing brought about by time-of-use pricing, if it im
proves the system load factor, will benefit everyone

ing the appropriate costs to provide the service they

in the pecuniary sense.

demand.

cost and the consumer will benefit from the lower rates

Since demand varies b y time of day and the
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The utility will be minimizing

that will be brought about.

has a large amount of gas space heating.

This would

necessitate, for example, allocating costs on a coin

In the gas business time-of-use pricing requires that
storage costs be allocated to those customers causing

cident demand basis and not spreading those costs by

the use of storage.

averaging over annual consumption, but weighing the

This necessitates seasonal rates

peak months heavier and the slack months with less oost

such that winter rates are higher than summer rates.

responsibility.

It makes little sense to allocate the fixed costs as
sociated with storage to the customer classes respon

MARGINAL COST PRICING

sible for storage and then spread those costs over the
entire years' consumption by averaging.

Rates should not be based on marginal costs at the cur

A gas utility

rent time.

with a correctly designed purchased gas adjustment
clause would necessarily cover its higher variable

to short run marginal oost.)

costs associated with storage during the winter months.

In

fact, they should be performed with the frequency that

probably not be covered through the adjustment clause

a utility performs an overall average oost of service

and vnuld hence have to be covered through base rates.

study.

An Mcf of gas used during the summer is not the same

Then they can be used to assist in the devel

opment of rate structures based on average costs.

as an Mcf used during the winter.

V*iy?

As noted above, I feel that rates should be time-vary

The important point I wish to stress is the market time
For an electric utility the traditional market

period has been a month.

This is not to say that

marginal cost studies should not be performed.

However, the fixed costs associated with storage would

period.

(In the following analysis I use marginal

cost in the sense of long run marginal cost as opposed

It actually, though, is an

ing for electric utilities and seasonally for gas util
ities.

But basing rates on marginal costs is an exer

cise in futility.

Traditional rate design is usually

infinite number of time periods since usage is for the

(or should be) based cn a oost of service study based

most part continuous over the period of the month.

cn average costs which are allocated or assigned to

But

costs differ over the month, over the day, and over the

the various classes of service.

hour.

based on judgement since no method exists far allocat

Since this is the case, usage during periods of

These allocations are

time having similar cost characteristics, ideally,

ing joint costs which is theoretically correct or pre

at)culd be segregated and rates should be based cn time-

cise.

of-day where metering costs are offset by benefits.

rate design.

typical breakdown is two or three periods:
and off-peak or peak, shoulder, and off-peak.

peak

pared.

For

There traditionally are three steps involved in
First, a oost of service study is pre

This is ccrrprised of the rate base or balance

sheet items and revenues and expenses cr inccme state

QQeting purposes the market period is the smallest unit

ment items.

of time for which data can be readily derived.

ous classes of service with average costs developed by

Many

Next the costs are allocated to the vari

electric load studies are based cn 15-minute data in-

dividing total oost by total units of consurrption.

tervals.

Finally, rates are designed based an tte average costs

As such, it would not be unrealistic to study

costs dcwn to this level.

However, for rate design

as previously developed.

Wrposes consumption during those periods having simicxost characteristics may be added together to give
b o or three homogeneous consurpticn periods.

How many steps would be in

volved to perform a marginal oost based rate design?
First, a marginal cost study nust be performed.

Thus,

(Note

that rates may be based on time of use far electricity

as traditionally, a bill could be rendered once per

or seasonally for gas using average costs.

“onth based on a billing of energy broken down by ccn-

marginal costs are used then electric rates must be

a®Ptian period.

differentiated as to time of use cr else it would be
senseless.

to the gas business, because of its nature, the market

oost periods, sometimes referred to as rating periods.

However, there is roan for seasonal

Next, rates will be designed on these marginal costs.

r*tes that vary by time of use cn an annual basis.
Storage costs, as noted above, is one area of oost that
*culd be segregated by tine of use.

This does not hold as strictly for gas.)

Judgement must be used in assigning the consumption

fine period probably should not be differentiated less
toan a month.

But if

Since marginal costs will only fortuitously equal
average costs, then a price elasticity study must be

Also, there is

performed.

“com for considering oost responsibility for other

Since a utility is constrained to histor

ical average costs if rates are based cn marginal

fixed costs more heavily during those time periods of
*®«vy use such as the winter months for a utility which

costs, then same method nust be used to equate margin
al costs with the constraint.
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Currently the most

widely accepted method is by using the inverse price

marginal costs given our current standards and forms

elasticity principle.

of regulation.

Not a simple average price elas

It is questionable if any of the inputs

ticity study, but cne differentiated by time of use or

to a utility's production function or any substitute

seasonally.

goods are priced at margined oost.

Thus far, siirple elasticity studies, that

Finally, I think

is those not differentiated b y time, have not proven to

that much of the work in this area has been done

be too conclusive and are not dynamic.

because of the captive nature of gas and electric util

Time differen

tiated studies are still for the most part of only

ities.

academic interest.

detailed costs are a matter of public record.

A price elasticity study also in

volves a great deal of judgement.

That is, since they have regulation, their

Next, rates nust be
FREE SERVICES

adjusted to meet the overall revenue requirement since
it is based cn average costs.

This adjustment may in

Being from Michigan, I am quite close to an example
of a so-called "free" service.

volve the use of the inverse price elasticity rule

The Detroit Edison

(as noted above) to adjust rates to meet the revenue

Company, for over sixty years, provided "free" light

requirement.

bulbs to its customers; i.e. at no direct oost.

Finally, we have rates.

It nust be

The

pointed out that since marginal costs are based on fu

costs of the program were picked up indirectly throu^i

ture costs, another degree of judgement is involved.

the rate structure. (16)

That is, the judgements involved in estimating costs

and Light Company is going to provide "free" insulation

over the time frame of the forward looking marginal

to residential hemes based on a no-interest loan that

cost study which may be five to ten years in advance.

doesn't have to be paid back until the customer sells
the home.

(17)

In Oregon the Pacific Power

The costs of this program will be

Thus with average cost-based rates we have one degree
capitalized and put into the Company's rate base.

What

of judgement involved - oost assignment to customer
is wrong with programs of this type?
classes.

Again the

With marginal cost-based rates we would have
TANSTAAFL. principle prevails.

four degrees of judgement.

Where do we end?

Vhen a service is pro

We end
vided at less than oost, it tends to be over-consumed

with rates that generate the same overall revenue
which is bad from a resource allocation point of view.
requirement that would be generated from rates based on
Also, in a free society which operates basicadly
average costs.

The oily difference which may possibly
through a market system, the consumers should pay for

come about is different revenue requirements between
the articles that they consume and payment should be
classes.
in direct relation to consumption.
Again I do not wish to detract from the theoretical
importance of marginal cost pricing.
real world, not a blackboard.
(14)

bulbs throu^i rates is indirect.

But this is the

against those who use few light bulbs oenpared to thoee

Blackboard economics

who use many.

gives us a perfect allocation of resources only if

(among other things) there is no government interfer

problem of the second best.

Also, there is the problem that antitrust im
This happened with Detroit

Edison and the potential exists in Oregon.

Thus we have the
Finally, programs of this nature nay look and sound

The principle of second

best basically states that since we don't have perfect
allocation of all resources, that is, there cure such

of some good or service to its marginal oost we may not

the result may be even more non-optimal.

price of natural gas set at marginal oost?

about by conservation.

Conservation will defray the

cost of adding high oost nuclear or fossil generation,
but that is not the point.

In fact

(15)

Those

ready will benefit because of lower energy oost brou^tt

^rc-wledge, government, etc. then if we force the price

have a more optimal allocation of resources.

good on paper, but what about in application?

persons in Oregon who have insulated their homes al

distortions in our economy as monopolies, imperfect

Electric water heaters?

former.

The latter is being subsidized by the

plications may come about.

ence with the market and price of all goods and ser
vices is set equal to marginal oost.

Paying for light
It also discriminabea

The point is that these

people will get this benefit, but also they have to

Is the

pay through their rates far insulation put into scmecM

Coal?

else's house.

Oil?

That someone else did not pay or help to

defray the oost of insulating the first individual's
Marginal cost studies should be performed, but they

house.

should be used as a tool to help in the design of rates
that vary with time and are based on average costs.

It

seaiti fruitless to me to base electric or gas rates on

This procedure

is certainly inequitable.

The

utility has no business establishing "free" programs.
The consumer of a good should pay the price of the good.
That is the way a market system and a free society
392

operates.
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